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INADVERTENT WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY DISCLOSURE OF 
DOCUMENTS: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
ALAN J. MEESE* 
"Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-may be 
pursued too keenly-may cost too much."1 
INTRODUCTION 
Like all evidentiary privileges, the attorney-client privilege ex-
ists in derogation of the truth.2 The protection of communications 
between attorney and client produces general and intangible benefits 
at the expense of concrete and specific harms. 3 This tension between 
the specific and the general, the known and the unknown, has pro-
duced hostility toward the privilege among judges and scholars.4 
This hostility towards the privilege manifests itself in several ways, 
including expansive definitions of waiver.5 Recent case law abounds 
A.B., The College of William and Mary in Virginia; J.D., The University of 
Chicago. The author, a member of the Virginia Bar, is a Law Clerk to Judge Frank H. 
Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for· the Seventh Circuit. Special 
thanks to Richard Murphy and Andrew Lee for their valuable comments and to the 
John M. Olin Foundation for financial assistance. 
1. Pearse v. Pearse, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (Ch. 1846) (discussing the marriage 
privilege), quoted in Note, Developments in the Law of Privileged Communications, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1450 (1985). 
2. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). The Court stated that 
"[w]hatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for everyman's evidence ... 
are in derogation of the search for truth." Id. 
3. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 
1961). The treatise stated that "[i]ts benefits [of the privilege] are all indirect and spec-
ulative; its obstruction [of truthfinding] is plain and concrete." Id. 
4. See Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued; More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 
54 COL. L. REV. 51 (1982); M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 64 (1980), cited in Al-
schuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or Cate-
gorical Imperative? 52 U. CoLO. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1981); C. McCORMICK, LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 176 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (stating that "[l]f one were legislating for a new 
commonwealth ... it might be hard to maintain that [the privilege] would facilitate 
more than it would obstruct the administration of justice."); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 
3, at § 2292, at 554 (recommending "[the privilege] ought to be strictly confined within 
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."); Note, 98 
HARV. L. REV. at 1478-79; Eigenheim Bank v. Halpurn, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991-92 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (urging "[a] need to limit the scope of the privilege"). 
5. See Note, Permian Corp. v. United States & The Attorney-Client Privilege for 
Corporations: Unjustified Severity on the Issue of Waiver, 77 Nw. L. REV. 223, 231-32 
(1982) (noting that hostility towards privilege contributes to an expansive notion of 
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with judicial constructions of the waiver prong of the privilege analy-
sis.6 Perhaps the most common form of contested waiver relates to 
privileged documents produced during the pretrial discovery process. 
To be precise, some courts have held that parties who voluntarily 
produce privileged documents during the discovery process waive the 
privilege, regardless of whether they intend to do so.7 Other courts 
take less extreme views, holding that the privilege is waived only in 
the absence of reasonable precautions to guard against production.8 
Still others hold that a subjective intent to waive is necessary.9 
This Article explores the doctrine of inadvertent waiver and the 
three standards governing it: strict responsibility, conduct, and sub-
jective intent. First, the Article takes a brief look at the privilege 
and the purpose which it serves, concluding that a narrow focus upon 
privacy or confidentiality is misguided.10 Instead, the attorney-client 
privilege is a sort of property right in information which encourages 
the flow of information between attorney and client.11 
This Article then analyzes the case law surrounding inadvertent 
disclosure, providing examples of the three standards mentioned 
above.12 After analyzing the standards applied, the Article examines 
the effect of the doctrine upon the policies which the privilege seeks 
to implement.l3 The Article questions whether there is any reason to 
apply standards of waiver in the document production context which 
are different than those applied in other property rights contexts.14 
An economic analysis shows that there is no reason for departing 
from the traditional requirement that a waiver be knowing and in-
tentional. The Article then analyzes the effect of the conduct and 
strict responsibility standards upon the values facilitated by the privi-
lege as well as the parties to litigation, again using conventional tools 
of economic analysis. This analysis reveals that both the conduct and 
waiver with respect to communications disclosed to the SEC); Marcus, The Perils of 
Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1654 (1986) (concluding 
that the judicial attitude toward waiver depends upon attitude toward privilege); Grip-
panda, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure of 
Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 525 (1985) (saying that too often courts fail to 
acknowledge the benefits of the privilege, leading to an expansive definition of 
waiver). See Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REv. 
637, 640-66 (1986) (surveying various forms of waiver). 
6. See irifra note 50 and accompanying text. 
7. See irifra notes 54-115 and accompanying text. 
8. See irifra notes 80-115 and accompanying text. 
9. See irifra notes 116-130 and accompanying text. 
10. See irifra notes 15-48 and accompanying text. 
11. See irifra note 33 and accompanying text. 
12. See irifra notes 49-130 and accompanying text. 
13. See irifra notes 131-160 and accompanying text. 
14. See irifra notes 162-179 and accompanying text. 
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strict responsibility approaches impose unwarranted social costs on 
attorneys, clients, and society at large. 
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the testimonial priv-
ileges, dating from the late sixteenth century.15 It remains the most 
entrenched of the evidentiary privileges.16 Congress has not explic-
itly adopted this privilege for federal courts; rather, it has directed 
the courts to develop various privileges "in light of reason and expe-
rience" in those cases in which federal law provides the rule of deci-
sionP Pursuant to this mandate, federal courts have adopted a 
common law relating to attorney-client privilege.18 
Federal courts have followed the approach of Dean Wigmore 
who stated that the privilege is obtained when eight conditions are 
met:19 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a pro-
fessional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the commu-
nications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) 
by the client, (6) are at [the client's] instance permanently 
protected (7) from disclosure by [the client] or by the legal 
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.20 
Invocation of the privilege conceals information from the tribu-
nal. Yet, there are offsetting benefits of the privilege. 21 Specifically, 
there are two possible purposes for withholding such information 
from the court: protecting privacy 22 and encouraging information 
15. Note, Developments in the Law of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 1450, 1456 (1985); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 559, 
560 (1985); Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577); Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng. 
Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580). 
16. E. GREEN & C. NESSON, EVIDENCE 535 (1983). 
17. FEo. R. EviD. 501. When state law provides the rule of decision, as in diversity 
cases, federal courts apply state privilege law. !d. See Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 
F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying New York privilege law in diversity action). 
18. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 
425 u.s. 391, 403-14 (1976). 
19. E.g., United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986); United States 
v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 700 (7th Cir. 1985). 
20. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 
1961). 
21. See infra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text. 
22. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1501-08; Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial 
Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 
613, 651-52 (1976); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in 
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956); Alschuler, The Preservation of 
a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or Categorical Imperative?,· 52 U. 
CoLO. L. REV. 349, 353-54 (1981); Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary 
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Under a privacy rationale, the purpose of the privilege is to pro-
vide the client with a small sphere of autonomy, free from the inter-
vention of an overreaching state.24 Such an approach ignores any 
possible benefits to the legal system from the invocation of the privi-
lege. Instead, a privacy rationale considers the invocation of the priv-
ilege as almost a categorical imperative.25 
Courts have rejected the privacy rationale, focusing on the utili-
tarian, information production approach.26 Under this approach, the 
privilege, which conceals truth from the tribunal, is adopted and pro-
tected only insofar as adoption and protection provides independent 
benefits to the legal system.27 Specifically, the privilege is a sort of 
property right which encourages the generation of information which 
in turn serves the goals of the justice system. By maintaining the 
confidentiality of communications between client and attorney, the 
privilege encourages clients to tell all to their attorneys.28 This pro-
System, and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495, 
499-513 (1982). 
23. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Iriformation, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 356-57; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal 
Advice About Iriformation to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 570 (1989); Rosenfeld, 33 HASTINGS L.J. at 508-09; Shavell, Legal 
Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirabil-
ity, and Protection of Corifidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 131-34 (1988); J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 20, at § 2291, at 554; Note, The Fifth Amendment, The Attorney-
Client Privilege, and the Prosecution of White-Collar Crime, 75 VA. L. REV. 1179, 1198 
(1989). 
24. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77, at 157 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). The 
treatise states that: 
!d. 
[I]t is evident that for many people, judges, lawyers, and laymen, the protec-
tion of confidential communications from enforced disclosure has been 
thought to represent rights of privacy and security too important to relinquish 
to the convenience of litigants. Growing concern in recent times with the in-
crease in official prying and snooping into the lives of private individuals has 
reinforced support for the traditional privileges and no doubt aided in the cre-
ation of new ones. 
25. Alschuler, 52 U. CoLO. L. REV. at 353-54. 
26. See Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate 
Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 476-81 (1987) (arguing that application of the 
privilege to corporations necessarily rejects the privacy rationale). 
27. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1503-05; State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 193 A.2d 
799 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963). The court stated that "[e]ncouraging these communications 
is desirable because the communications are necessary for the maintenance of certain 
relationships. It is socially desirable to foster the protected relationships because other 
beneficial results are achieved, such as the promotion of justice." !d. at 807. 
28. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "If such communications 
were required to be made the subject of examinations and publication, such enactment 
would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and assistance." United 
States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at 
§ 2290, at 545; C. McCORMICK, supra note 24, § 87, at 175. The Supreme Court has 
stated that "[a]s a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information 
1990] ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 517 
vides the legal system with two discrete benefits, depending upon 
when the communication is made.29 Chief Justice Shaw recognized 
these benefits over a century ago when he wrote: 
This principle we take to be this; that so numerous and com-
plex are the laws by which the rights and duties of citizens 
are governed, so important is it that they should be permit-
ted to avail themselves of the superior skill and learning of 
[attorneys] both in ascertaining their rights in the country, 
and maintaining them most safely in courts ... that the law 
has considered it the wisest policy to encourage and sanction 
this confidence, by requiring that on such facts the mouth of 
the attorney should be for ever sealed.30 
Communications made before an alleged wrong allow attorneys 
to properly counsel clients in their attempts to obey the law "out in 
the country."31 Communications made after the alleged wrongdoing, 
during litigation, help the lawyer guide the client though the laby-
rinth of the legal system.32 At common law, courts feared that if 
they did not protect such confidences, parties would not even retain 
attorneys but would come into court themselves and wreak havoc on 
the legal system. 33 
Some scholars have suggested that the pre-litigation or planning 
justification is a stronger rationale.34 Specifically, they note that the 
generation of such information may not be as useful during litigation 
as it is beforehand. Inadvertently produced documents generally fall 
into this second, planning category.35 They are generally letters from 
clients to attorneys or other documents produced well before litiga-
could be more readily obtained from the attorney following disclosure . . . the client 
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. 
29. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1505. 
30. Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833). 
31. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. The Court stated that the attorney-client privilege 
"promotes broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of 
justice." Id. (emphasis added). 
32. One court has stated that "(t]he layman's course through litigation must at 
least be evened by the assurance that he may, without penalty, invest his confidence 
and confidences in a professional counselor." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
33. Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, Sage & Co., 5 How. Pr. 254, 258-59 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1851). The court stated that "(i]f the facts thus communicated were liable to be 
extorted from the attorney or counsel, suitors would hesitate to employ them, to the 
great inconvenience of the court, and obstruction of judicial business." Id. at 258. 
34. Kaplow & Shavell, 102 HARV. L. REV. at 568-88; Easterbrook, 1981 SUP. CT. 
REV. at 360-65. 
35. See, e.g., Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D. 
46, 48 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (containing letter from general counsel describing current state 
of antitrust resale price maintenance enforcement). See also Manufacturers & Traders 
Trust v. Servotronics, Inc. 132 A.D.2d 392, -, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002 (1987); O'Leary v. 
Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 643 (M.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel 
Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954). But see Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi 
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tion has begun. Hence, they fall under the strongest justification for 
the privilege, a justification upon which this article will now focus. 
FOSTERING THE RULE OF LAW 
Encouraging open and frank discussion between attorney and cli-
ent during planning stages fosters the rule of law.36 The rule of law 
requires that individuals be able to understand their rights and duties 
and order their lives accordingly.37 When the rule of law does not 
obtain, parties are unable to order their behavior and are thus less 
likely to engage in a legally protected activity.38 Such analysis ap-
plies to any society governed by laws.39 Yet, it has taken on increas-
ing importance for corporations in an administrative state whose 
rules are ever-expanding in both reach and complexity. In Upjohn 
Co. v. United States,40 the United States Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized this importance, stating that "[i]n light of the vast and 
complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern 
corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, 'constantly go to 
lawyers to find out how to obey the law' particularly since compli-
ance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter."41 
Without the confidentiality assured by the privilege, clients face 
a difficult dilemma. If they reveal damaging information to their at-
torney, they increase their chances of future legal battles. Yet, if 
they fail to come clean to their advisor, they risk violating the law 
and increase the possibility of initiating such a battle in the first 
place. Faced with such a choice, clients will certainly provide less in-
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing some documents which had 
been generated during litigation). 
36. Note, Developments in the Law of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 1450, 1505-08 (1985); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary 
Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 354. 
37. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, 72-87 (1944); J. LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF 
GoVERNMENT §§ 136-37 (2d ed. 1970); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 238 (1971); L. 
FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-64 (1965). 
38. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 156-57 (1960); T. RAWLS, supra 
note 37, at 235. 
39. Over a century before the rise of the modern welfare state with all its attend-
ant complexities, Jeremy Bentham remarked: "The multitude have not leisure for 
profoundly studying the laws: they do not possess the capacity for connecting together 
distant regulations-they do not understand the technical terms of arbitrary and artifi-
cial methods." Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE WORKS 
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 161 (J. Bowring ed. 1843) cited in Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 
1506. 
40. 449 u.s. 383 (1981). 
41. Id. at 392 (citations omitted). For earlier statements of similar principles in 
the federal courts, see United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 
1977) (discussing the increased use by a business in seeking advice as to future con-
duct); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 320-24 (7th Cir. 1963) 
(describing the increased use of attorneys by corporate clients). 
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formation to their legal advisor than they would given the existence 
of the privilege. As a result, individuals and corporations will be less 
able to order their lives, engage in legally-protected activity, and will 
violate the law more often.42 Of course, these costs will be offset by 
increased truth reaching the tribunal in the case that clients still 
choose to consult with attorneys. Yet, less such truth will exist with-
out the privilege than with it. Specifically, in those cases in which 
clients refuse to consult an attorney, there will be no story for the 
attorney to tell.43 A small table making this comparison may help 
illustrate. 
Truth to Tribunal 
Privilege Exists: 
No Privilege: 
Zero 
T:+(f)Y 
Consultations with Attorney 
X 
Y=X=Z44 
Thus, in deciding whether to protect such communications, society 
must decide whether the loss in communications (Z) and thus the 
rule of law, is of lesser or greater value than the increased truth 
reaching the tribunal (T). More formally, society should adopt the 
privilege if: 
+dT(Value of truth)> -dZ(L) (Value of Law Obedience).45 
Here, support for or opposition to the privilege depends upon an im-
possible empirical guess as to whether, absent the privilege, clients 
will still consult their attorneys, provide them with incriminating in-
formation, and receive legal advice.46 History has struck such a bal-
ance in favor of the privilege, a judgment reaffirmed by the Upjohn 
42. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1506-07 (discussing social benefits of increased cli-
ent awareness of legal rights). 
43. One commentator has stated that "[b]ecause the same information might not 
exist were it not for the privilege, any loss of information when the privilege is upheld 
may be more imagined than real." Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers 
and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597,610 (1980). See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
449 u.s. 383, 395 (1981). 
44. Where X is the number of conversations which would take place with the 
privilege, Z is the number of conversations which would be forgone without the 
privilege, T is the amount of truth which would reach the tribunal, and T is a positive 
function of Y and thus a negative function of Z. 
45. Where L is the increase in social welfare resulting from an increase in obedi-
ence and understanding of the law derived from a consultation. See generally Note, 98 
HARV. L. REV. at 1506-07 (discussing these social benefits). 
46. Easterbrook, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. at 361 (describing such analysis as a "stupify-
ing task"); Saltzburg, Corporate Privilege In Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases: 
Garrow revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 822 (1984) (stating that "the adoption of the 
privilege represents an educational guess about behavior"); Note 98 HARV. L. REV. at 
1474-1480. 
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majority.47 The Court in Upjohn decided that failure to adopt the 
privilege would so hinder the rule of law that any loss in truth is 
justified. 48 
CASE LAW DEALING WITH INADVERTENT WAIVER 
In the case of document production, several courts have held that 
once a document is produced it loses its privileged status, regardless 
of whether the client intended the production to take place.49 These 
doctrines force the client to bear the burden of disclosure, regardless 
of whether he intended to waive the privilege. Many times such 
"waiver" waives more than the privilege with respect to the docu-
ments in question. Courts often hold that the waiver of the privilege 
with respect to the document also waives the privilege as to other 
matters dealing with the same subject matter.50 Hence, the inadver-
tent production of one document may waive the privilege as to all 
documents or conversations dealing with a particular subject matter, 
greatly increasing the cost of disclosure. 
In recent years, federal and state courts have dealt with the issue 
of inadvertent waiver with increasing frequency. Typically, a party 
has inadvertently produced a document or allowed the opposition to 
view it during discovery and is now either seeking its return or refus-
ing to answer a question founded on the document.51 Unfortunately, 
the facts of the cases do not admit of a single generalization in one 
crucial respect. To be precise, producing parties do not always allege 
that they took reasonable precautions to guard against release of the 
document. The lack of such factual uniformity often makes it diffi-
cult to determine which standard the court has applied. Specifically, 
in those cases in which there are no allegations of care, courts are 
able to reach the same result by applying either of two approaches.52 
In such cases, there are no clear holdings; courts often appear to be 
applying a mesh of the approaches .. Commentators, however, have 
divided these approaches into three categories: strict responsibility, 
conduct, and subjective intent.53 
47. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402. 
48. /d. at 395. 
49. See supra notes 54-115 and accompanying text. 
50. See Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 
63 (D.D.C. 1984); Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 107 N.M. 679, -, 763 P.2d 1144, 
1152-53 (N.M. 1988). 
51. See, e.g., International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 
445, 446 (D. Mass. 1988) (dealing with production during discovery); Underwater Stor-
age, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 547 (D.D.C. 1970). 
52. See, e.g., W.R. Grace v. Pullman, 446 F. Supp. 771 (W.O. Okla. 1976); Underwa-
ter Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 546. 
53. Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney Client 
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STRICT RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH 
The traditional approach,54 favored by Dean Wigmore, is the so-
called strict responsibility approach.55 Under this approach, any pro-
duction of documents waives the privilege, whether or not that pro-
duction is inadvertent. Some courts purport to apply such a test. For 
instance, in Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,56 
the plaintiff's attorney inadvertently turned over a privileged letter 
to the defendant.57 Defendant questioned plaintiff's attorney about 
material contained in the letter.58 The attorney refused to answer 
the questions, citing the attorney-client privilege.59 The defendant 
sought an order compelling an answer.so 
The court ordered the attorney to answer the question.61 Hold-
ing that the privilege was waived, the court appeared to follow a 
strict approach, stating that "the plaintiff turned over to his attorney 
the documents to be produced. This letter was among them. The 
Court will not look behind this objective fact to determine whether 
the plaintiff really intended to have the letter examined."62 
A few courts have followed the rule of Underwater Storage. For 
instance, in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc.,63 the plaintiff pro-
duced privileged documents during discovery.64 Later the plaintiff 
sought an order returning the documents.65 The court refused to is-
sue the order.66 In so doing, the court cited Underwater Storage, stat-
ing that "[o]ne cannot produce documents and later assert a privilege 
which ceases to exist because of the production."67 
Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 607-19 (1983) (discussing "traditional," "reasonable 
precautions," and "voluntary disclosure approaches"); Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the 
Attorney Client Privilege: The Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in Inadver· 
tent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59, 70-83 (1986) (discussing strict responsibility, 
analysis of the circumstances, and intent approaches). 
54. Some commentators have referred to this approach as the traditional ap-
proach. See Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 607. See also Manufacturers & Traders Trust 
Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, -, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (1987). Note, how-
ever, that the earliest case to deal with the issue adopted a conduct approach. See 
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
55. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 636 (McNaughton rev. ed. 
1961). 
56. 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970). 
57. ld. at 547-48. 
58. Id. at 547. 
59. Id. 
60. ld. 
61. ld. 
62. ld. at 549. 
63. 446 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Okla. 1976). 
64. ld. at 773. 
65. Id. 
66. ld. at 775. 
67. Id. (citing Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549). 
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Both Underwater Storage and Grace are generally treated as 
strict responsibility cases, i.e. relying on the so-called traditional ap-
proach.68 Yet, as some commentators have noted, these two cases are 
not strong precedents for such a proposition.69 Specifically, neither 
case contained an allegation of reasonable care on the part of the pro-
ducing party. These two cases mirror others in which the courts used 
the language of strict responsibility, but faced no allegation of reason-
able care. 70 In fact, the Grace court relied upon the lack of precau-
tions in reaching its decision stating, "[i]n the instant case, Defendant 
Pullman voluntarily produced the documents almost four months af-
ter a Request for Production was served on it. Notwithstanding the 
apparently voluminous amount of discovery involved, said Defendant 
could have taken necessary steps to remove purportedly privileged 
documents prior to permitting discovery."71 
Indeed, in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transport,72 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit cast some doubt on the strict responsibility approach of Under-
water Storage. Specifically, the court noted that "[p]erhaps this latter 
rule [the traditional approach] should not be strictly applied to all 
cases of unknown or inadvertent disclosure; this, however, is not a 
case where any such exception would be appropriate. Here, the dis-
closure cannot be viewed as having been [totally] inadvertent in all 
cases."73 Hence, these two cases, as well as others, are in a sort of 
twilight zone.74 While these courts purport to use a traditional, strict 
approach, their results could be achieved by means of a reasonable 
care standard. 
There is one true strict responsibility case: International Digital 
Systems Corp. v. Digital Equipment Corp. 75 In this case, the court 
considered a claim of inadvertent waiver.76 In the opinion, the magis-
trate considered all possible standards. 77 After carefully examining 
the precautions taken by the producing party and pointing out inade-
quacies, the court rejected such an approach. Magistrate Callings 
stated, "I do not find application of this doctrine to 'inadvertent' dis-
68. See, e.g., Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 607. 
69. See, e.g., Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through In-
advertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 519-21 (1985). 
70. See Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 63-64; Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Assoc's., 
470 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuller, 695 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1985). 
71. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775. 
72. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
73. Id. at 675. 
74. See, e.g., Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 63-64; Rockland Indus., 470 F. Supp. at 1176. 
75. 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988). 
76. /d. at 446. 
77. /d. at 448-49. 
1990] ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 523 
closure particularly useful. . . . I see little benefit to doing a 
painstaking evaluation of the precautions taken by plaintiff's counsel 
when it is noted that the whole basis for the privilege is to maintain 
the confidentiality of the document."78 The court, citing Underwater 
Storage, then rejected the producing party's privilege request.79 
CONDUCT APPROACH 
The earliest modern case to deal with the inadvertent waiver 
problem was United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co. 80 In Kelsey, 
the corporation in an antitrust action allowed the government to in-
spect its files, which contained privileged documents.81 Later, when 
the government sought an admission that certain documents were 
genuine, the defendant refused, citing the privilege.82 The court or-
dered the production of the documents, holding that the privilege 
had been waived by production.B3 
In ordering the production of the documents, the ·court empha-
sized that they were no longer confidential because of the initial in-
spection by the government, stating that "the context in which the 
rule is intended to serve, the protection of confidential communica-
tions, is no longer present."84 The court also questioned the intent to 
maintain confidentiality by noting that the defendant had made "no 
special effort to preserve them in segregated files with special protec-
tions. . . . One measure of their continuing confidentiality is the de-
gree of care exhibited in their keeping."B5 
Several courts have built upon the idea of using precautions to 
measure intent.86 Others have adopted the so-called "conduct" stan-
dard without claiming that conduct is an indicium of intent.87 These 
courts have adopted what one commentator has referred to as a con-
duct standard.88 Under this standard, courts treat a party's conduct 
78. !d. at 449. 
79. !d. at 449-50 (citing Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549). 
80. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
81. !d. at 462. 
82. !d. 
83. ld. at 464-65. 
84. !d. at 465. 
85. !d. 
86. See, e.g. Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1985) 
(finding that the procedural screening involved showed production was not a deliber-
ate act); Parkway v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D. 46, 46 (M.D.N.C. 
1987) (holding that "failure to take action and precautions will be imputed to the client 
in determining his intent or understanding with respect to confidentiality"). 
' 87. See, e.g., Hartman, 107 N.M. at 679, 763 P.2d at 1144. 
88. Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 513. 
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as the best indicator of whether there was intent to waive.89 In 
Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern,90 for instance, the court noted that 
"mere inadvertence" would not constitute a waiver.91 The corporate 
defendants had accidentally produced a document in response to a 
discovery request.92 In determining whether the document should 
have been returned, the court looked closely at the reason for the 
"inadvertent" production.93 After finding that the document was 
only one of thirty requested and that it had been identified as privi-
lege in earlier litigation, the judge held the privilege to be waived, 
stating "I simply cannot agree with defendants that their conduct 
constituted mere inadvertence. The procedure followed by defend-
ants with regard to maintaining the confidentiality of this document 
was 'so lax, careless, inadequate or indifferent to consequences as to 
constitute a waiver.' "94 
While Eigenheim appears to adopt a conduct standard, it did lit-
tle to clarify the criteria used to determine if the standard is met. 
Other cases have done so.95 For instance, in Hartman v. El Paso Nat-
ural Gas Co.,96 the Supreme Court of New Mexico considered and 
adopted a conduct standard.97 In so doing, the court listed five fac-
tors which should assist a court in determining whether an inadver-
tently produced document should retain its privilege.98 In the court's 
words: 
[There are] five factors which should assist a court in deter-
mining whether a document has lost its privilege: (1) The 
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadver-
tent disclosure in view of the extent of the document pro-
duction; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the 
extent of the disclosure; ( 4) any delay and measures taken to 
rectify the disclosures; (5) whether the overriding interests 
of justice would be served by relieving a party of its error.99 
The court went on to note that "when measuring El Paso's conduct 
by these factors, we find its conduct lacking."100 Several courts have 
adopted a similar approach, looking at the conduct of the producing 
89. ld. at 513-15. 
90. 598 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (interpreting New York privilege law pursu-
ant to a diversity action). 
91. ld. at 991-92. 
92. Id. at 989. 
93. ld. at 990-91. 
94. ld. at 991. 
95. See infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text. 
96. 107 N.M. 679, 763 P.2d 1144 (1988). 
97. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152. 
98. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152. 
99. Id. (citing Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 50). 
100. Hartman, 107 N.M. at -, 763 P.2d 1152. 
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party as an indicator of the party's intent to maintain 
confidentiality .101 
The conduct standard has two broad components. Courts first 
look to the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent disclo-
sure in the first place.102 This initial inquiry is three-pronged. The 
first prong examines actions taken before litigation. Clients them-
selves can segregate privileged and non-privileged documents at the 
document generation stage before litigation actually takes place.103 
The second prong of analysis applies once litigation begins. Parties 
may take care at this production stage so that privileged documents 
are not produced.104 In determining whether parties have taken 
proper precautions during the production stage, courts look to several 
factors.105 Courts usually examine the screening procedure used.106 
Parties may screen documents one by one, removing those privileged 
from the discovery process.107 Alternatively, parties can prepare doc-
uments for production, compiling an index as they go and removing 
privileged documents after all the documents have been prepared.108 
Parties may also adopt more than one level of review.109 Courts 
often examine the competence of the screeners, asking whether they 
were capable of distinguishing privileged from non-privileged docu-
ments.110 Precautions are more likely to be found reasonable if an 
101. Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. 87-7132 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) (LEXIS, 
Genfed library, Dist file); Kanter v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 803, 253 Cal. 
Rptr. 810 (1988); Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d at 392, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 999; Liggett Group, 
Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Marathon 
Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 12. 
102. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A. Inc. v. Levi Corp., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating "Levi apparently had no practice of designation of confidential 
documents at the time of origination"). . 
103. Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 7-8; Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick In-
dus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465. 
104. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105; Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21; National 
Heluim v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 612, 615 (1979); Hartman, 107 N.M. at-, 763 P.2d 
at 1152. 
105. For a discussion of these factors, see Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 619-23. See also 
Developments in the Law, New York Recognizes an Exception to Waiver of Attorney-
Client Privilege for Fraudulent Voluntary Disclosure of Privileged Documents, 62 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 752, 757-58 (1985) (discussing factors courts should consider in evaluat-
ing reasonableness of precautions). 
106. One court has formulated the test as "a good faith, sufficiently careful, effort 
to winnow a relatively small volume of privileged materials from a very large number 
of documents." National Helium, 219 Ct. Cl. at 615. 
107. Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d at -, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-1005; Lois Sportswear, 104 
F.R.D. at 105. 
108. International Digital Sys., 120 F.R.D. at 446-47. 
109. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1978) (dis-
cussing IBM's use of two levels of screening during massive expedited discovery); 
Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 51 (stating that "when large numbers of documents are in-
volved, a post-designation review may be necessary). 
110. Kanter, 206 Cal. App. 3d at -, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 819; Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d 
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attorney, rather than a paralegal, did the screening.111 In the third 
step to determine "reasonableness," courts ask how many documents 
were actually produced.112 If a large percentage of those produced 
are privileged, the courts are likely to find that the precautions were 
unreasonable.113 
The second component of the conduct analysis deals with actions 
taken once documents have been released. Specifically, courts often 
ask how long an interval existed between the time of release and the 
time when the releasing party sought return of the documents.U4 
Such an inquiry says nothing about the care taken before the release; 
instead, it looks at action taken afterwards. When producing parties 
have waited a substantial period before attempting to retrieve a docu-
ment, courts are more hostile to claims that there was no intent to 
waive.115 
SUBJECTIVE INTENT APPROACH116 
Some courts have rejected the conduct and strict responsibility 
approaches, adopting the so-called subjective intent approach.l17 The 
at-, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. C.f. Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 51 (suggesting that counsel, not 
independent copier service, copy documents). 
111. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
112. See Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 51 (stating that "[a] large number of inadvertent 
disclosures in comparison to the number of disclosures shows lax, careless, and inade-
quate procedures"); Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105 (finding no waiver when only 22 
of 16,000 requested documents were privileged). 
113. Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21; Kanter, 206 Cal. App. 3d at -, 253 Cal. Rptr. 
at 819; Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 7. 
114. Serootronics, 132 A.D.2d at-, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005; In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
115. See Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d at 674; Hariford, 109 F.R.D. at 332 (sug-
gesting a quick rectification of error militates against waiver); Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 
51. 
116. The term "subjective intent" is taken from the opinion in Kanter, 206 Cal. 
App. 3d at -, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16, which used this term to describe the standard 
adopted in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In 
Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in 
Inadvertent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59 (1986), the author refused to adopt the 
term "subjective intent," fearing that such a term would refer to intent at the time of 
the controversy, as opposed to the time of the release. In both theory and practice, it is 
not difficult to distinguish between subjective intent at the time of release and 
subjective intent at the time of controversy. This article uses the term in the former 
sense. 
117. Commentators are split as to whether there is a difference between a conduct 
approach and an intent approach. Compare, Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 513-15 
(placing cases such as Mendenhall under the conduct rubric) with Comment, 18 PAC. 
L.J. at 83 (placing cases such as Mendenhall in a separate "intent" category). The 
Mendenhall case is clearly distinguishable in a real sense from so-called conduct cases. 
In Mendenhall, the court explicitly noted that negligence by an attorney could not 
waive the privilege. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. 
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most prominent subjective intent ca5e is Mendenhall v. Barber-
Greene Co. 118 In Mendenhall, the producing party's attorney pro-
vided the opponent's counsel with several files.119 No action was 
taken to cull privileged documents from these files.120 The receiving 
party then moved for production of four privileged documents, claim-
ing that the allowance of inspection had waived the privilege.121 The 
court denied the motion, despite a belief that the producing attorney 
may have been negligent.122 In so holding, the court adopted unusu-
ally strong language against a conduct approach: 
We are taught from first year law school that waiver imports 
the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.' Inadvertent production is the antithesis of that con-
cept .... Mendenhall's lawyer (not trial counsel) might well 
have been negligent in failing to cull the files of the letters 
before turning over the files. But if we are serious about the 
attorney-client privilege and its relation to the client's wel-
fare, we should require more than such negligence by coun-
sel before the client can be deemed to have given up the 
privilege.123 
Several courts dealing with the problem of inadvertent waiver 
have cited Mendenhall ;124 producing parties have sought its sup-
port.125 Yet, few courts have adopted its reasoning. At least one 
court has misinterpreted Mendenhall ;126 most have explicitly re-
jected it.127 Indeed, only two opinions have adopted Mendenhall's 
logic.128 One opinion came from a magistrate in the northern district 
of Illinois, the same court which decided Mendenhall.129 The other 
opinion came from an appeals court in Michigan, which was appar-
ently unaware of the Mendenhall decision.130 
118. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
119. /d. at 952. 
120. /d. at 954. 
121. /d. at 955. 
122. /d. 
123. /d. (citations omitted). 
124. Hartman, 107 N.M. at-, 763 P.2d at 1152; Hariford, 109 F.R.D. at 329; Kanter, 
206 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 816; Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 11; O'Leary v. Pur-
cell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 646 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21. 
125. See, e.g., Hartman, 107 N.M. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152; Hariford, 109 F.R.D. at 
329. 
126. See O'Leary, 108 F.R.D. at 646 (stating that Mendenhall adopts conduct analy-
sis); Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21 (purporting to adopt Mendenhall but still engaging 
in conduct analysis). 
127. See Hartman, 107 N.M. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152; Hartford, 109 F.R.D. at 329; 
Kanter, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 816. 
128. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
129. In re Sealed Case, 120 F.R.D. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the privilege is 
not waived by inadvertent production). 
130. Sterling v. Keidan, 162 Mich. App. 88, 412 N.W.2d 255 (1987) (finding waiver 
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AN EVALUATION OF THE CASE LAW 
There are three anomalies apparent in the case law. The first is 
its reliance upon the confidentiality (privacy) component of the privi-
lege. As noted earlier,131 the United States Supreme Court has 
adopted the information production justification of the privilege and 
has said nothing about privacy. Several courts, especially those that 
have adopted a form of the strict responsibility approach, have re-
jected the information production justification approach and adopted 
a privacy rationale in the waiver context.132 When parties have inad-
vertently released documents (or disclosed their contents), these 
courts place great emphasis upon the fact that the documents no 
longer possess their confidentiality. This is why some courts have 
held that the question of waiver will be decided with reference to 
whether the receiving party has learned the "gist" of their 
contents.133 
The second anomaly in this context is the various definitions of 
waiver and intent applied to these cases. As noted earlier, the 
Supreme Court has adopted the information production rationale for 
the privilege.134 Such a rationale creates a property right in informa-
tion in order to foster the production of such information. It seems 
that, in a property rights context, the doctrine of inadvertent waiver 
is a misnomer. The court in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.,135 of 
course, took the traditional approach to waiver; in order to waive the 
privilege, a party must intend to do so.136 Many courts pay lip service 
to such a standard. However, as we have seen, these courts have 
adopted a strange definition of intent.137 Specifically, the majority of 
only when producing party consciously releases a document which it knows might be 
privileged, deciding to take the risk). The court stated that the law requires that, "an 
implied waiver be judged by standards as stringent as for a 'true waiver.' " /d. at 162 
- , 412 N.W.2d at 260. 
131. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
132. Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. 87-7132 at 5-6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); International Digital Sys. Corp v. Digital Equip. 
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449-50 (D. Mass. 1988); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National 
Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 63, 67 (D.D.C. 1984); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes 
Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. 
Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6, (S.D. Ohio 1977); Underwater Storage Inc. v. 
United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970). 
133. Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 6; Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 63; Ranney-Brown, 75 F.R.D. at 
7 (scheduling a hearing to determine if confidentiality was lost). See also Parkway 
Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (M.D.N.C. 1987) 
(holding when an opponent has learned contents of the documents, a very strong 
showing with regard to other factors is required to defeat waiver). 
134. See supra note 47. 
135. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
136. /d. at 955. 
137. See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. 
Ill. 1981) (holding that failure to shred the documents before disposing of them consti-
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courts infer intent from the precautions taken by the producing 
party.138 As the court in Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc. 139 noted, courts 
should ask whether the "precautions taken by [the producing party] 
were ... sufficient to protect their interest."140 At first glance, this 
may seem sensible. However, it must be recalled that it does not an-
swer the central question, to wit, why should producing parties have 
to protect their interest in the first place, when their interest could 
be protected just as easily by requiring the receiving party to return 
inadvertently produced documents? 
The third anomaly within these cases is the tri-level of standards 
applied. These three standards, of course, correspond to the three 
standards of care which may or may not impose liability in tort: in-
tent, negligence, and strict liability. While commentators split over 
the utility of the reasonable precautions and the intent test,l41 no 
commentator, save Wigmore,142 supports the strict responsibility ap-
proach.143 Those commentators who favor a conduct approach over a 
strict responsibility approach provide little basis for their prefer-
ences.144 One commentator simply notes that precautions are a good 
indicator of intent.145 Another commentator claims that a conduct 
approach is more predictable than the strict responsibility ap-
proach.146 No commentator has explained the effect of the possible 
standards upon the production of information sought by the privi-
tuted an intent to waive), cited in Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the 
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1618 n.70 (1986). 
138. See, e.g., Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 7. 
139. No. 87-7132 at 5-6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, dist file). 
140. /d. at 7. 
141. See Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Necessity of Intent to Waive the 
Privilege in Inadvertent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59, 81-82 (1986) (advocating sub-
jective intent standard); Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver 
Through Inadvertant Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 523-25 (1984) 
(advocating conduct approach); Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 64 OR. L. REV. 637, 651 (1986) (favoring subjective intent standard, except in cases 
in which the receiving party changes position based upon reliance on privileged docu-
ment); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Priv-
ilege, 82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 616 (1983) (favoring reasonable precautions approach). 
142. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
143. Note, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 598 (conduct standard); Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. at 511 (conduct standard); Developments in the Law, New York Recognizes an 
Exception to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege for Fraudulent Voluntary Disclosure 
of Privileged Documents, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 752, 758 n.33 (1985) (appearing to reject 
conduct standard except in cases of reliance by receiving party); Comment, 18 PAC. L. 
REV. at 93 (subjective intent); Davidson & Voth, 64 OR. L. REV. at 644-45 (arguing 
waiver should be limited to cases in which adverse party changes position in reliance). 
144. See in.fra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
145. Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 624. 
146. Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 524. Such an assertion is but a canard. 
Surely a strict responsibility approach is more predictable than a conduct approach. If 
you produce, you lose. 
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lege.147 More important, no court has explained why courts should 
import tort liability standards into the law of waiver. The court in 
Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc. 148 provided 
some insight for this reasoning: 
We reject the traditional approach, however, because it rests 
on the faulty and unrealistic premise that the only interest 
protected by the attorney-client privilege is secrecy .... The 
fact that information is publicly available does not necessar-
. ily make it admissible in evidence. Moreover, although con-
fidentiality can never be restored to a document already 
disclosed, a court can repair much of the damage done by 
disclosure by preventing or restricting the use of the docu-
ment at trial.149 
From the client's perspective, there is more damage to disclosure 
than the breach of confidentiality. Disclosure before the tribunal 
will have adverse effects on litigation. Clients who face this possibil-
ity are less likely to consult their attorneys in the first place.150 
The first anomaly should not be of concern. The court in Upjohn 
Co. v. United States 151 necessarily rejected a privacy approach,152 and 
courts invoking such an approach fly in the face of that decision. The 
last two anomalies are of concern, and a brief analogy will highlight 
the reason for such concern. Suppose that Ed leaves his house and 
negligently leaves his door unlocked. Sally enters his house and 
removes Ed's collection of baseball cards.153 Ed returns but does not 
realize that his cards are missing. Once he realizes that they are 
missing, he brings suit against Sally alleging tortious conversion of 
his cards. At trial, Sally admits the conversion but pleads a defense 
of contributory negligence. By leaving the door unlocked, she says, 
147. See generally Marcus, 84 MICH. L. REV. at 1609-17 (noting some effects of the 
traditional (strict responsibility) approach, without discussing conduct approach). 
148. 132 A.D.2d 392, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1987). 
149. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, -, 
522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (1987). 
150. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
151. 449 u.s. 383 (1981). 
152. See Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate 
Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 476-81 (1987) (suggesting that the extension of 
privilege to corporations involves a rejection of the privacy approach). 
153. Of course, parties who receive inadvertently produced documents are not bur-
glars; they are more akin to "finders." This distinction is irrelevant to the analysis 
here. Suppose Ed had negligently left his baseball cards at Sally's house. Under the 
law of finders, Sally would be liable for conversion if she did not return the cards. See 
J. 0UKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 4, 6 (2d ed. 1988); P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROP-
ERTY 23 (1984). Indeed, knowing retention of a chattel without reasonable efforts to 
contact the true owner subjects one to penal sanctions in some states. See, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 485 (West 1988). 
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Ed manifested an intent to waive the right to his baseball cards. 
What result? 
Sally loses, of course. Negligent failure to guard against theft 
does not waive a property right. It is hornbook law that contributory 
negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort.154 Allowing such a 
defense would make little sense as it would shift the burden of pre-
cautions onto the party least able to bear them. It is certainly less 
expensive for Sally to fail to enter Ed's house than it is for Ed to 
make sure that he always locks his door.155 As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently noted in a related 
context: 
The best solution is for people not to harm others intention-
ally, not for potential victims to take elaborate precautions 
against such depredations. If the victims' failure to take pre-
cautions were a defense, they would incur costs to take more 
precautions (and these costs are a form of loss these victims 
would feel in every case, even if the tort does not occur).156 
The burglar cannot escape because the victim left his door un-
locked. Nor can a finder refuse to return a lost watch because the 
loser was careless.157 So too, a party should not be able to retain 
privileged documents because their owner was careless in producing 
them. Absent subjective intent to waive, parties should retain their 
property right in information. At first glance, determining such in-
tent is difficult.158 Who knows what the party was thinking at the 
moment of production? Who wants to waste judicial resources find-
ing out? 
Such criticisms miss the mark. A subjective intent test should 
not focus on a person's state of mind at the time of production. Be-
cause production is inadvertent, ex hypothesi, a party can have no in-
tent about the document in question.l59 Instead, such a test should 
focus upon the party's intent at the time he is alerted to the fact of 
production. In the same way that rules of tort law force parties into 
154. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS § 65, at 462 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 481, 482 (1965). 
155. See generally W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 162-65 (1987). 
156. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 528 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (holding that under the Federal Securities Laws, contributory negligence is 
no defense in an action under Rule 10(B)(5)). 
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
158. Comment, 18 PAC. L. J. at 83 (arguing that the definition of intent used in 
these cases is unclear). 
159. Marcus, 84 MICH. L. REV. at 1634 (pointing out that "[in such cases] there was 
probably not only no intent to waive, but not even an intent to deliver the materials to 
the opponent"). 
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voluntary exchange transactions,160 so too should the law of inadver-
tent waiver force the receiving party to alert the producer to the fact 
of production and obtain a waiver at that time.161 
This analogy points to a more basic problem with requiring pre-
cautions for document releases. Specifically, what harm is there to 
releasing a document? At first glance, there appears to be none. Yet, 
the courts apparently contemplate two types of harm: frustrated reli-
ance by the opposition and loss of truth in the adversary process. 
Both of these harms may justify departing from a subjective intent 
standard. This Article now examines each justification in turn. 
RELIANCE 
Some courts have suggested that a release of privileged docu-
ments may result in reliance by adverse parties.162 According to 
these courts, requiring a return of documents after such reliance 
takes place frustrates the expectations of the opposing party.163 Rou-
tine return of documents which have been produced and relied upon 
will do more than frustrate reliance, it will create uncertainty in the 
litigation process, forcing parties to overinvest in the production of 
information.164 A party who does not know which documents he 
may introduce at trial is likely to spend extra resources seeking in-
formation which he would not need if the privileged documents were 
available. For this reason, courts look to the interval of time between 
when a document is produced and when its return is sought in deter-
mining whether the privilege has been waived. 
An example of such a problem may be helpful. Suppose that the 
producing party (a defendant) inadvertently produces a privileged 
document in January. The document contains information useful to 
the plaintiff's case, obviating the need for further investigation of a 
particular matter. The plaintiff thus plans to use the document at 
trial and concentrates on seeking evidence to prove other elements. 
Eight months later, defendant seeks to introduce the document at 
trial. Plaintiff objects, claiming that it is protected by privilege. 
What result? 
It seems clear that the privilege should be lost. Plaintiff has re-
160. W. Landes and R. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1981 In-
ternational Review of Law and Economics 127, 142-43. 
161. See irifra note 176 and accompanying text. 
162. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 675 
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d at -, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004. 
163. Davidson & Voth, 64 OR. L. REV. at 644-45; Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 623. 
164. C.f. First Wisconsin Mortgage v. First Wisconsin Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174 
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding privilege not waived when producing party gained no advan-
tage from production). 
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lied upon the availability of the document and has made his informa-
tion investment decisions accordingly. Refusal to admit the 
document now can only result in unfair surprise, or a further delay, 
as plaintiff seeks information elsewhere. Indeed, it seems possible 
that the defendant has used the disclosure strategically.165 By releas-
ing the document and seeking to recall it, defendant could be hoping 
to induce such reliance in hopes of frustrating it later. As the court 
noted in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation :166 
[I]t would be unfair and unrealistic now to permit the privi-
lege's assertion as to these documents which have been thor-
oughly examined and used by the government for several 
years. The Government attorneys' minds cannot be ex-
punged, the grand jury is familiar with the documents, and 
various witnesses' testimony regarding the papers has been 
heard.167 
The law contains an analogy for such a situation. Specifically, 
one thinks of property law and the law of adverse possession. One 
illustration is a variation on the above hypothetical. Assume that in-
stead of taking Ed's baseball cards, Sally simply moves into the 
house. Ed stays away for twenty years. Sally's possession of the 
house is (1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) exclusive, ( 4) continu-
ous, and (5) hostile and under claim of right.168 Upon his return, Ed 
seeks to eject Sally from the land. What result? Most probably Ed's 
suit would be barred by a statute of limitations, a statute designed to 
implement the law of adverse possession.169 This result would obtain 
regardless of Sally's subjective state of m'ind.170 Such a result serves 
two purposes.171 First, it protects Sally's reliance interest; second, it 
encourages the productive activities in which she is engaged.172 In 
165. See Marcus, 84 MICH. L. REV. at 1636 (stating that "if unintended delivery of 
privileged material could always be taken back ... there could be continual uncer-
tainty about whether privilege would actually be asserted as to items produced in dis-
covery, a prospect that could disrupt trial preparation"). 
166. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
167. /d. at 675 (citations omitted). 
168. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 153, at 100 (2d ed. 1988). 
169. ld. at 87. The law of adverse possession rarely exists as such. Instead, it takes 
the form of limitations of actions for ejectment. See id. 
170. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1122, 1123 n.8 (1984). 
171. See, Comment, Compensation for the Involuntary Transfer of Property Be-
tween Private Parties: Application of a Liability Rule to the Law of Adverse Posses-
sion, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 758, (1984). Two other purposes served by the doctrine of 
adverse possession, "the development of otherwise idle property and to grant title in 
the equitable owner of the land ... [derive from] the principles of economic efficiency 
and fairness." ld. at 772. 
172. For example, as the court stated in LaFrombois v. Jackson, 8 Law. 589 (N.Y. 
1826): 
But for the intervention of the statute, [barring an action for ejectment] there 
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the same way, the receiving party in document production claims a 
sort of adverse possession in the privileged document. Hence, there 
seems to be some sense in courts looking at the length of time be-
tween production and the time when return is sought. Some com-
mentators, otherwise hostile to the doctrine of inadvertent waiver, 
have supported such a test.173 
Closer analysis reveals that these commentators, and the courts 
with which they agree, are wrong. First, the example probably mis-
states the law of adverse possession. Contrary to conventional state-
ments of hornbook law, courts do look to the possessing party's state 
of mind in determining whether to bar an action by an actual 
owner.174 It is true that defendants in ejectment actions need not 
specifically plead and prove subjective good faith.175 Yet, one com-
mentator noted that "the cases do clearly show that the trespasser 
who knows that he is trespassing stands lower in the eyes of the 
law."176 This examination of subjective intent may make little sense 
in many adverse possession cases. Take our example above. Even if 
Sally knew that the land was not hers, the cost (to her) of determin-
ing ownership of the land was quite high. Further, Ed is probably in 
a good position to know whether someone else is occupying his land. 
Hence, placing the loss on Ed seems to make sense, because he is bet-
ter able to notify Sally that her reliance will be for naught. 
Whatever the merits of examining subjective intent under the 
law of adverse possession, such an approach is eminently sound in 
our cases of claimed reliance upon a document. If a receiving party 
knows that the document is privileged, the cost of notifying the pro-
ducing party and inquiring about subjective waiver is nearly zero. 
This differs greatly from the case of adverse possession in which 
Sally, though knowing she is trespassing, has no idea who owns the 
land. Conversely, in document production, once the document leaves 
the hands of the producing party, that party has no means of deter-
would be no end to the revival of dormant and antiquated titles, and many an 
honest citizen, who now, by its benignant operation, enjoys in security the few 
acres his industry has acquired, and which have been improved by his labour, 
and enriched by the "sweat of his brow," would be driven from his home by 
an enemy, more insidious and more destructive to the peace of the community 
than an invading army. 
/d. at 616. 
173. Davidson & Voth, 64 OR. L. REV. at 644-45 (advocating that the principle of 
waiver be limited to cases in which adversaries have changed their position in reliance 
upon the evidentiary availability of a privileged document). See also Developments, 62 
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. at 758 n. 33. 
174. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 332 
(1983). 
175. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 153, at 94-95; RESTATEMENT (2D) OF 
PROPERTY § 458 (1944); Helmholz, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. at 332. 
176. Helmholz, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. at 332. 
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mining that it has been lost. Put another way, the receiving party is 
in a much better position to avoid a loss from reliance, once the docu-
ment has been produced.177 Further, the receiving party will always 
subjectively know that the document is privileged. It is difficult to 
see how a party can claim to have relied upon a document without 
carefully scrutinizing it. Reliance itself is certain to reveal the privi-
leged nature of the document. Once such a revelation occurs, the re-
ceiving party is in an excellent position to notify the producing party 
about the privileged nature of the document and seek a knowing 
waiver. At the time such a notification takes place, the receiving 
party has yet to rely upon the availability of the document in decid-
ing whether to gather more information. Hence, prompt notification 
of the producing party will not frustrate any reliance on the part of 
the receiving party. 
LOSS OF TRUTH 
The second form of harm against which departure from an in-
tent standard guards is the loss of truth suffered by the adversary 
process. By failing to take proper precautions, divulging parties allow 
documents to come into the adversary process. Then, after the truth 
has come out, the document returns to the owner, essentially de-
stroying truth. Adopting a strict responsibility approach causes par-
ties to take care, generating fewer documents in the first place.178 
This also reduces the number of false productions. Further, when 
such documents are produced, the documents remain before the tri-
bunal, greasing the wheels of the judicial process. Adopting a con-
duct approach forces parties to take care, reducing the amount of 
documents originally produced.179 
There is, of course, something wrong with this view. The fact 
that a document has changed hands twice does not reduce the 
amount of truth reaching the tribunal any more than the failure to 
release it in the first place. Further, the very existence of the attor-
ney-client privilege contemplates the concealment of truth. As noted 
earlier,180 the attorney-client privilege exists because of an empirical 
estimate that its benefits outweigh its costs, i.e., that a failure to pro-
tect the privilege will result in greater harm than that which results 
from the reduction of truth flowing to the tribunal. There is no 
doubt that the loss of truth is a harm, but the existence of the privi-
177. See Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d at 674 (discussing that upon receipt of 
privileged documents Antitrust Division promptly notified producing party which ex-
plicitly stated that it intended to disclose documents). 
178. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 80-116 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
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lege manifests a decision that this harm cannot be eliminated without 
creating more. Is there any reason to believe that a strict responsibil-
ity or conduct approach to the inadvertant production of documents 
will eliminate this harm without eliminating the benefits of the privi-
lege? It would seem not; documents are simply another form of com-
munication covered by the privilege. Their protection follows simply 
from principles established long ago at common law. Failure to pro-
tect documents by adopting loose standards of waiver would seem to 
violate the solid support of the privilege established in Upjohn. 
EFFECT UPON VALUES BEHIND THE PRIVILEGE 
Thus far, this Article has suggested that the inadvertent produc-
tion of a document causes no harm to the legal system above and be-
yond that already contemplated by the attorney-client privilege. 
Further, the Article has suggested that there is no reason to adopt a 
standard of intent different from that employed in other property 
rights contexts. Yet, as already noted, most courts do not use a sub-
jective intent approach. Instead, they use either a conduct or a strict 
responsibility standard. Below, this Article examines the effect 
which each of these standards will have upon the values supporting 
the privilege. 
STRICT RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH 
Under a strict responsibility approach, the privilege is conclu-
sively waived with respect to all privileged documents which are pro-
duced.181 Hence, a party who wishes to communicate with his 
attorney in writing faces some chance that such communications, if 
they survive until the discovery stage, will find their way into the liti-
gation process. Indeed, absent any precautions, this probability seems 
quite high, especially given the existence of an opponent skillful at 
manipulating the discovery process. 
Here, a producing party is akin to an individual facing the pros-
pect of strict liability for injuries that he causes. Such a party could 
react in two ways. The client could take care that such documents, 
once generated, never reach the other party.182 As noted earlier, 
there are two ways of preventing these documents from being circu-
lated. Clients may either segregate privileged and nonprivileged doc~ 
uments in their own files before litigation actually begins or they 
may take care at the document production stage to prevent the divul-
181. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text. 
182. SeeR. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 161 (3d ed. 1986); W. LANDES 
& R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 66-67 (1987); S. SHAVELL; Eco. 
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 23 (1987). 
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gence of privileged documents.183 Unlike a negligence standard, 
which will produce only those sorts of care that courts examine,184 a 
strict responsibility standard will produce the proper balance be~ 
tween the various levels of care available.185 Further, it will en-
courage parties to innovate, to discover more effective ways of 
protecting documents from disclosure.186 Hence, parties will invest 
resources in all cost-effective methods of care, including research and 
development of new ones. The relative amounts of such care will de-
pend upon their effectiveness and relative costs.187 These costs will 
include both out-of-pocket costs and agency costs. As agency costs 
between attorney and client rise, parties will take proportionately 
more care at the segregation and generation stage, where no such 
costs exist. 
A client could also react to the possibility of strict liability by re-
ducing the overall activity level.188 To be precise, a client could re-
duce the actual number of documents produced. Such a reduction 
could be accomplished in several ways. The client could simply seek 
less legal advice, seek legal advice only in oral, rather than in written 
form,189 or destroy relevant documents once the legal advice has 
been received. 
Hence, the rule of strict responsibility will have several discrete 
effects upon the behavior of clients and their attorneys, all of which 
represent social costs. First, parties will spend real resources at the 
pre-discovery and post-discovery stages, both segregating documents 
when they are generated and screening them during production. Sec-
ond, both parties will invest real resources developing new ways to 
protect documents from disclosure. Third, parties may destroy rele-
vant documents after the documents have been generated and have 
served their purpose. Such destruction represents both an out-of-
pocket and an administrative cost. Firms must pay the actual cost of 
destruction and disposal; the firms must devise a system of institu-
tional memory which operates without documents. This will make it 
more difficult for firms to hire employees for short periods of 
183. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra notes 141, 145-47 and accompanying text. 
185. SeeS. SHAVELL, supra note 182, at 17. 
186. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 367 (1988). 
187. S. SHAVELL, supra note 182, at 9. 
188. See R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 161; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 
181, at 66; S. SHA YELL, supra note 182, at 21-26. 
189. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 362 (stating that "[i)f certain writ-
ings are discoverable, people may find ways to carry on their business orally or in 
code"). 
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time.19° Firms will be forced to prefer long-term workers who 
"know the score" without the need to consult documents produced by 
their predecessors. 
Fourth, parties will reduce the number of documents produced 
and reduce the amount of legal advice sought or shift their communi-
cations to an oral form. Such a shift will result in more legal viola-
tions and more litigation as parties receive less exact legal advice.191 
Reliance on oral communications will again bias the labor market to-
ward long-term employees as firms rely on human institutional 
memories. The use of oral communications may also make parties 
take fewer risks. Fifth, such a rule will certainly encourage the op-
ponents of producing parties to increase the size of their discovery re-
quests, because such requests will impose even greater costs than 
usual upon producing parties.192 
CONDUCT APPROACH 
Effects of a Well-Defined Standard 
The effect of a reasonable precautions approach upon clients in-
voking the privilege depends pivotally upon the way in which the 
standard is administered.193 Under a properly administered reason-
able precautions approach, courts examine each and every contem-
plated decision by a firm and determine whether it is cost justified.194 
Such a system would involve examining both the amount of activity 
conducted and the care taken given such conduct.195 However, courts 
are generally not competent to evaluate activity levels.196 Hence, in 
asking whether a car driver was negligent, courts do not ask whether 
the driver drove the car too much in comparison to the benefits de-
rived from that driving. Instead, courts ask, given that the driver 
drove, did the driver do so reasonably.197 Similarly, courts in the im-
plied waiver context do not consider activity level; they do not ask 
whether the producing party generated too many documents while 
consulting its attorney before litigation. Instead, courts take the ac-
tivity level as given and examine the level of care. In this context, 
190. I owe this idea to Nancy Goodman, a student at the University of Chicago Law 
School. 
191. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
192. See Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nu-
clear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U.L. REV. 569, 581-84 (1989). 
193. S. SHA VELL, supra note 182, at 83. 
194. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 66-67; S. SHAVELL, supra note 182, 
at 9, 17. 
195. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
196. R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 161. 
197. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 66-67 n.22; S. SHAVELL, supra 
note 182, at 6; R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 161. 
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courts ask whether parties took reasonable care. As noted above, 
such a determination involves comparing the cost of precautions (B) 
with the reduction in harm which the precautions bring about. More 
precisely, courts ask whether, at the margin, the cost of additional 
care equals the reduction in expected accident costs (P*L).198 Hence, 
parties take due care when: 
+dB=-dPL 
Any more care would be inefficient, because it would induce too 
small a decrease in ·the expected value of accidents. Less care would 
be inefficient. Society could reduce accidents by more than the cost 
of additional care.199 
To apply this formula, a court needs some idea of what the po-
tential harm is. As the earlier discussion shows, the benefits of care 
are unclear.200 Or, to put it another way, what type of injury does 
the producing party hope to avoid by taking care? There is no exter-
nal injury to society from the release of a document. The only harm 
caused by such a release is the harm to the producing party itself. 
Such harm is represented by the increased expected value of a judg-
ment (J) against the producing party which results from the new evi-
dence which the producing party has inadvertently placed before the 
tribunal. Given this analysis, the above formula for determining 
whether the producing party took due care evolves into: 
+dB=-d(PJ)D.201 
To determine whether a party has taken due care, a court must bal-
ance the marginal cost of that care against the marginal increase in 
the expected value of a judgment against the producing party. 
Assuming that a court is able to gather the information neces-
sary to determine the proper level of care to be taken in the docu-
198. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge 
Learned Hand wrote: 
[T]he owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting 
injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will 
break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden 
of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to 
state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the 
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P. 
Id. See Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949); United States Fidelity & 
Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982). See generally 
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 96-107 (arguing [with copious citations and 
analysis] that courts have traditionally applied "the Hand formula" to negligence 
problems). 
199. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972). 
200. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
201. Where Pi is the Probability of Judgment and D is the amount of damages 
flowing from that judgment. 
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ment production and generation process, what effects will such a rule 
have? First, parties will spend real resources at the generation and 
production stage in an attempt to meet the standard set by the court. 
This will involve document segregation programs and various screen-
ing procedures at the production stage. Second, unlike a rule of strict 
responsibility, a reasonable precautions approach will not encourage 
the development of new screening procedures.202 Courts will merely 
define reasonable precautions in terms of known technology and 
methods. Third, a properly defined negligence rule will have no di-
rect effect upon the activity level of the firm.203 The client will pro-
duce the same number of privileged documents as he would have 
produced under a subjective intent rule. Hence, a negligence stan-
dard will not directly decrease the information flow between attor-
ney and client. Therefore, the rule of law values behind the privilege 
will not suffer. Such a rule, however, may have small wealth effects. 
Specifically, when parties spend real resources on care, their aggre-
gate wealth will drop when compared to that which would exist 
under a subjective intent regime. When such wealth drops, we can 
expect a corresponding decrease in document generation. While this 
effect is real, it will probably be quite small, because the costs of seg-
regating and screening documents are quite small compared to the 
aggregate wealth of firms. 
Effects of a Poorly-Defined Standard 
In our imperfect world, of course, the application of such a stan-
dard is exceptionally difficult. Specifically, courts are probably quite 
unable to determine the costs and benefits of relevant care. This 
problem may take several forms. 
One problem is that of sequential care. As noted several times, 
parties can take care at both the generation and production stages. 
Given these two loci of care, one would expect a court to examine the 
care taken at both levels in order to determine whether the produc-
ing party took reasonable precautions. Some courts examine such 
precautions,204 but this is not always the case. As is the case in negli-
gence law generally,205 courts very often ignore care taken at the 
generation level, instead focusing upon the amount of care taken at 
202. See supra note 54-79 and accompanying text. 
203. Recall that we have assumed that courts take activity levels as given. 
204. Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. 87-7132 at 7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick In-
dus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D. Ohio 1977); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 
15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
205. S. Shavell, supra note 182, at 9, 17. 
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the production level.206 If parties know that courts will ignore the 
care taken at the generation level, they will cease taking care at that 
level.207 Instead, they will focus all their energy upon taking the 
legally-mandated precautions at the production level. At first glance 
this does not seem right. Surely the first unit of care at the genera-
tion level will yield greater benefits (in the form of fewer releases) 
than the last unit of care employed at the production stage.208 A 
party seeking to protect its interests would certainly invest some of 
its limited resources in pre-production segregation, instead of using 
all those resources at the production screening stage. 
True, proper precautions would involve care at both levels. Yet, 
if a court only scrutinizes one level, requiring a particular level of 
care, a party would be wasting its resources by taking care earlier. In 
other words, it would be in a party's best interest to meet the produc-
tion level standard and ignore care at the generation level.209 Once it 
has met the production level standard, a party will never be said to 
have waived the privilege, and hence care at the earlier level would 
be duplicative. 
A second similar problem is a misdefinition of the proper 
amount of care at either level. For instance, courts may set the stan-
dard too low, requiring too little screening at the production level, or 
too little segregation at the production level. When this is the case, 
parties will simply reduce their expenditures on care accordingly. 
They will take no more care than is necessary to satisfy the rule, 
knowing that satisfaction of the rule will nullify all chance of poten-
tial waiver.210 Given the conclusion that there is no reason for any 
care in the first place, such a result would be a happy one, at least 
compared to a "properly-designed" standard of care because such a 
standard would involve a smaller waste of real resources. 
On the other side of the coin, courts may set the standard of care 
too high. They may require all sorts of precautions which, from the 
perspective of the producing party, only marginally reduce the ex-
206. Kanter v. Superior Court, 206 Cal App. 3d 803, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1988); Kan-
sas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1985); Man-
ufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999 
(1987). 
207. S. SHA VELL, supra note 182, at 9. 
208. This is simply an application of the principle of diminishing marginal produc-
tivity. See P. WONNACO'IT & R. WONNACOTT, ECONOMICS 665-66 (2d ed. 1982). 
209. S. SHAVELL, supra note 182, at 9, 17. C.f. Developments in the Law, New York 
Recognizes an Exception to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege for Fraudulent Volun-
tary Disclosure of Privileged Documents, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 752, 758 (1985) (sug-
gesting that factors considered in any reasonable precautions test will, in effect, 
become a standard of conduct for the bar). 
210. S. SHA VELL, supra note 182, at 83; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 
124. 
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pected values of judgments. Such an outcome will produce results 
which mimic those obtained under a strict responsibility approach.211 
Because the cost of reaching the standard would be too high, parties 
will react by taking only a cost-justified level of care. Even given this 
level of care, parties will still be found lacking from a precautions 
standpoint. Hence, they will waive the privilege with respect to any 
document produced. Given this situation, parties will move to a 
lower activity level, reducing the number of documents generated in 
the first place. Such a reduction will have the same negative conse-
quences for the production of information and the rule of law as the 
adoption of a strict responsibility standard. 
Strategic Behavior 
A final by-product of a conduct standard is strategic behavior. 
Earlier we noted that a strict liability rule would encourage receiving 
parties to abuse the discovery process.212 Specifically, such a rule 
would encourage receiving parties to make large discovery requests 
upon the producing party, in the hope of imposing costs in the form 
of released documents and screening costs. A negligence rule will 
have similar but more expansive effects. Not only will receiving par-
ties have an incentive to request more documents, producing parties 
will want to produce more. As noted earlier,213 courts often measure 
the reasonableness of precautions indirectly, to wit, by counting the 
number of documents actually produced. Hence, the higher the pro-
portion of privileged to non-privileged documents produced, the 
greater the chance that precautions will be said to be unreasonable. 
A producing party facing such a rule has an obvious incentive to 
overproduce non-privileged documents so as to decrease this ratio. 
Such overproduction imposes costs on the adversary process, as pro-
ducing parties spend time amassing irrelevant, non-privileged docu-
ments and receiving parties wade through those documents. 
CONCLUSION 
The attorney-client privilege is a type of property right which 
encourages the production of useful information, facilitating the rule 
of law. The privilege is especially important at the planning stage, 
before litigation takes place. At this stage, parties must have the lib-
erty of exchanging information with their attorneys in order to know 
the law and abide by it. This is especially so for a large corporation 
211. See W. LANDER & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 124-25 (setting negligence 
standard too high is equivalent to a strict liability standard). 
212. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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governed by complex rules in the pervasively regulated administra-
tive state. 
Against this background, the doctrine of inadvertent waiver 
makes little sense. As in other areas of property law, the waiver of a 
right should be reserved for those cases in which a party makes a 
knowing, objective decision to do so. Most courts, however, have not 
adopted this approach. Instead, most courts have adopted either a 
strict responsibility approach or a conduct approach. 
This Article has demonstrated that the adoption of such stan-
dards is misguided. Specifically, these standards impose social costs 
without corresponding benefits. Under a strict responsibility stan-
dard, parties will both take care and reduce their level of document 
generation. This will create two sorts of social costs: resources will 
be spent on care and parties will receive less effective legal advice. 
The first result is simply wasteful; the second is in direct derogation 
of the purposes of the privilege. A conduct standard which forces 
parties to make prompt objections to released documents is mis-
guided. It forces the producing party to guard against unjustified re-
liance which the receiving party could easily avoid. A properly 
defined and administered conduct standard will force parties to spend 
real resources to guard against the production of documents and re-
sult in strategic behavior. Unlike a strict responsibility standard, 
which reduces the flow of information between attorney and client, 
the conduct approach does not impact adversely on the rule of law; it 
is simply wasteful. Producing parties spend real resources to guard 
against production without any corresponding social benefit. A legal 
system which seeks to minimize social costs and facilitate the flow of 
information between attorney and client, fostering the rule of law, 
should not stray from the traditional notion of waiver. 
